Boat Plans Wood | The 56 day rule – a further example

Boat Plans Wood

I am grateful to Greg Dowden of Indigo Planning for passing on to me a copy of a double appeal decision (3065819 and 3133462) in Richmond issued last November, which demonstrates how a local planning authority can come unstuck on the 56-day rule, and the consequences they may then face in terms of costs. The two prior approval applications that were the subject of these appeals were dated 20 October 2014, and each was refused by notice dated 30 December 2014. In each case, the development proposed was change of use from B1(a) to C3 residential to provide two 2-bed dwellings. One application proposed one on-site car parking space and the other proposed two on-site parking spaces.

The Council received the two prior approval applications on 23 October, as acknowledged on their web-site. On 4 November the Council requested revised site plans showing the car parking spaces, and these were provided, after which the Council stated that the applications were accepted as valid on 5 November. On the basis of the date that the Council received the applications, the 56 days would expire on 18 December, whereas if taken from the date when the Council stated that the applications were valid, the 56 days would expire on 31 December. The refusal notices were dated 30 December 2014.

The GPDO does not contain a requirement or provision for applications to be validated, as is confirmed by the Court of Appeal decision in Murrell, but paragraph W(2) lists the information that must accompany an application, including ‘a plan indicating the site and showing the proposed development’ and paragraph W(3) provides that a local planning authority ‘may refuse an application where, in the opinion of the authority the developer has provided insufficient information to enable the authority to establish whether the proposed development complies with any conditions, limitations or restrictions specified in this Part as being applicable to the development in question.’ The Council claimed that whereas they could have refused the application when they considered it did not provide the necessary information, ‘in the spirit of reasonableness an e-mail was sent to the appellant on 4 November 2014’ requesting the site plan showing the car parking. Whilst it appears to be the case that the appellant complied with the request and supplied another site plan, this approach is not what is provided for in the Order, and the Inspector referred again to Murrell, which confirmed that a request for further information does not stop the clock. Whether or not the application did contain the necessary information, as set out in sub-paragraph (2), the choices open to the Council were clear - accept the information or refuse the application under paragraph W(3). [The Council was, of course, entitled to request further information, but still had to determine the application within the 56-day period.]

The council also fell into error in relation to their consultations. They sent out a consultation letter dated 7 November 2014, that is to say after the request for and receipt of, the disputed site plan, stating that “We are writing to advise you that this Council has received the above prior notification on 23 October 2014 and are required to give notice on any adjoining owner or occupier of the proposed development. Any comments must be received within 21 days from the date of this letter i.e. 28/11/2014 because the local planning authority must issue written notice to the developer within 56 days from receipt of the application (31/12/2014) that either prior approval is not required or prior approval is granted, otherwise the developer may proceed”. In the terms of the GPDO (see paragraph W.(11)), the 56 days calculated from the stated date of receipt, 23 October would end on 18 December, not 31 December as stated by the council.

The Inspector noted that there appears to have been some interchangeable use by the Council of the words ‘received’ and ‘valid’ but the wording in the GPDO is clear - “56 days following the date on which the application under sub-paragraph (2) was received by the local planning authority”. The Inspector therefore concluded that the 56 days should be considered as running from the acknowledged date of the Council’s receipt of the applications, 23 October 2014, and expired on 18 December. In the absence of a written notice under paragraph W(11) by that date, the permitted development could now proceed.

The LPA raised two other issues on appeal. The first of these was whether the building was in use within Use Class B1(a) on 29 May 2013, or if it was not in use on that date, when it was last in use before that date. The appellant produced a statutory declaration to which a lease was exhibited, showing that the appeal premises were leased as offices until surrender of the lease in November 2007. The Inspector accepted that Class B1(a) could be taken to be the lawful use of the building. No other use had been shown to have been established or permitted between the surrender of the lease and 29 May 2013. The Council and others had referred to various indications to the contrary, but no firm evidence was submitted, even where this might reasonably have been obtainable by the Council, such as the business rate record. On the balance of probabilities on the information available, the Inspector therefore concluded that the premises in question were in B1(a) office use on 29 May 2013, or when last in use prior to that date, and that the proposed change of use was therefore development that is permitted under Class O.

The other issue raised by the LPA related to transport and highways impacts. The Inspector did not accept the Council’s contentions in this regard, and in any event, having determined that the Council had missed the 56-day deadline for determining the prior approval application, it would not have been open to him to consider any transport and highways impacts of the development [nor could any contamination risks or flooding risks on the site be taken into account by the Inspector in these circumstances].

The Council also suggested various conditions, but since the Inspector had already concluded that the appellant was entitled to go ahead with both developments in any event, there was no basis on which he could attach further conditions in addition to the standard ones contained in Class O. Unilateral obligations under section 106 (relating to the proposed parking arrangements) had been submitted to the Council with the prior approval applications, but they were subject to a proviso that “the obligations in this Deed are conditional upon the receipt from the Council of a written notice that Prior Approval is not required or a receipt from the Council of a written notice giving their Prior Approval”. Neither of these events had occurred and so the Inspector confirmed that these planning obligations under section 106 are not binding on the appellants.

Having got it so comprehensively wrong, the Council can hardly have been surprised that a full award of costs was made against them, although they did their best to resist the costs application. The appellant had sent an e-mail to the Council on 30 December 2014 stating their view that the 56-day period had elapsed, and by return e-mail the Council disagreed with that view, issuing the refusal notice that day. The Council did not agree that the premises were in B1(a) use on 29 May 2013 or when last in use. There were several options open to the appellant after the expiry of what they viewed as the 56-day period, or after the receipt of the refusal notice. First, they could accept the situation as stated by the Council and make a planning application for the proposed development instead. Secondly, they could carry out the development on the basis of their view that the 56 days had elapsed, so that it was now lawful to go ahead with the two developments. Thirdly, they could submit an application for a lawful development certificate for the proposed development, on the basis that the development applied for had become lawful due to the Councils failure to respond within the 56-day statutory period. Finally, they could lodge an appeal against the Council’s purported refusal of prior approval (and also against its failure to determine the application with the 56-day period).

Obviously, a planning application was not a realistic option, and might have been dismissed, quite apart from the expense and delay that would have been involved. The second option would also have carried a significant risk in view of the difference of opinion with the Council, both over the 56-day period and over the qualifying office use, and could well have led to enforcement action being attempted against the appellant. The third option of seeking a lawful development certificate would have been less risky but likely to lead to the same differences of opinion being aired as became the subject of these two appeals, with the possibility of refusal. (Another option referred to by the Council of obtaining a lawful development certificate to show the lawful use at 29 May 2013 would also have resulted in delay.) These appeals were a reasonable response to the situation and the only real option open to the appellant.

The appellant had in fact made continuing attempts to avoid the cost and delay of appeal. This started with the e-mail of 30 December, the response to which was the Council’s assertion that the 56 days was still running followed by the refusal notice. On 24 March 2015 the appellant contacted the Council to again to give them the opportunity to rectify what was seen as an error, but the Council refused. The first appeal was submitted on 3 May 2015 and the appeal in respect of the second development appears to have followed a few months later. It is unclear why this occurred, but possibly in light of the Council continuing to contest the first appeal.

On the procedural matters that the Council alleged were relevant to the costs issue, the Inspector drew attention to his accompanying appeal decision and the reference to the Murrell case, which explained the situation regarding the amount or quality of information submitted for prior approval, it being for the Council to accept it or refuse the application; there is no provision for ‘stopping the clock’ from the operative date of receipt of the application provided that the information is as required under paragraph W(2).

On the substantive grounds, there was a lack of evidence to back counter-claims on the B1(a) use, in the face of the statutory declaration. Parking was a matter that had been accepted by a previous Inspector for what appears larger numbers of domestic users, although the loss of any commercial users would have had an effect, but the dimensions of the parking and access were stated not to have changed.

Ministerial advice on costs in appeals is now set out in the online Planning Practice Guidance (although it largely repeats the basic principles that were previously set out in the well-known costs circular). Among the sins on the part of LPAs that may result in an award of costs are:

• preventing or delaying development which should clearly be permitted, having regard to its accordance with the development plan, national policy and any other material considerations; (The Inspector decided that the LPA’s conduct had had that result in this case.)
• acting contrary to, or not following, well-established case law; (The Murrell case and the GPDO give the procedure for accepting or rejecting information in a prior approval application, but not ‘stopping the clock’.)
• failure to produce evidence to substantiate each reason for refusal on appeal; (In the circumstances of this case, because of the operation of the 56-day rule, this did not arise in this case with regard to transport and highways, and the evidence produced by the LPA in defence of their contrary view of the B1(a) use was lacking.)
• persisting in objections to a scheme or elements of a scheme which the Secretary of State or an Inspector has previously indicated to be acceptable. (Once again this did not in fact need to be addressed in the Appeal Decision, but a previous Inspector had ruled on highway and parking matters for a similar-enough proposal. The appellant had to bring evidence to address this at appeal in case their 56-day claim failed.)
• not reviewing their case promptly following the lodging of an appeal against refusal of planning permission (or non-determination), as part of sensible on-going case management. (The appellant gave the Council numerous opportunities to address the case and avoid the appeal, and these were not taken.)

The Inspector reiterated that the appellant had little viable option but to appeal, having taken all available steps to avoid that state of affairs and had then tried to broker a reason to withdraw it, but to no avail. As a result the appellant had been put to the cost of appeals that should have been avoided, by the Council’s refusal to accept that the 56 days had elapsed and by their persisting with the claim that the proposal was not permitted development [by reason of the disputed B1(a) use] and that it would result in highway impacts. He therefore found that unreasonable behaviour resulting in unnecessary or wasted expense, as described in the Planning Practice Guidance, had been demonstrated and that a full award of costs was justified in both appeals.

I felt it was worth reporting this appeal decision (and the accompanying costs decision) fairly fully, because it is a graphic example of a local planning authority’s failure to appreciate how the 56-day rule operates, and the consequences of missing the 56-day deadline. The costs decision is also in line with similar decisions in other cases, and it behoves LPAs to sit up and take notice, and to ensure that planning officers clearly understand how the prior approval procedure under Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO actually operates.

© MARTIN H GOODALL


Do you find information about Boat Plans Wood are you looking for? If not, below may help you find more information about the Boat Plans Wood. Thank you for visiting, have a great day.

Read More..

Wooden Boat Plans Australia | B1 a to C3 – an early example

Wooden Boat Plans Australia

NOTE: For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of the changes of use that are now authorised by the GPDO, and the way in which these are (or should be) handled by Local Planning Authorities, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book on the subject - ”A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

I happened to spot the following item among pending planning applications in Bristol the other day:

Prior approval for the change of use from detached three storey building currently as 3 separate self contained office units on lower, ground and first floors from office space within Use Class B1(a) to two-bedroom apartment on lower ground floor, and 2-bed apartment on ground floor of residential accommodation falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses)

The application was put in the post on 10 June, was received by the LPA on 13 June and registered by them on the 14th, so congratulations to both the applicant and the LPA for being so quick off the mark on this one. No application form was available, so the applicant simply wrote a letter setting out the required information and enclosing the necessary plans. This is all that is required, so the LPA quite rightly treated it as a valid application and immediately registered it.

The application does not fit neatly into the new scheme – it is not a one-for-one change of use, so it will be interesting to see how the LPA deals with it; but (knowing the site myself) I would be a bit surprised if anyone objects.

Multiple conversions to form a group of apartments, or a block of flats, might be more problematic, so other cases may be less straightforward than this one seems to be. There could in fact be quite a rush of these applications over the next three months, especially where multiple conversions are involved, in view of the introduction of the £80 application fee on 1st October.
___________________

UPDATE (4.7.13): News is reaching me of various applications for change of use from offices to residential use that have been made over the past month to a number of different LPAs around the country. One eager and very efficient developer even managed to get their application in on 31st May! So we should begin to learn within the next few weeks how a range of different councils are handling these applications. The 56-day period will expire on the very earliest application on 26 July, and the others in the pipeline will fall due during August. It looks as though there will then be an increasing number of others following these in the months to come. There will be no prize for the first LPA that lets one of these applications through by default by failing to determine it within the time limit.

© MARTIN H GOODALL


Do you find information about Wooden Boat Plans Australia are you looking for? If not, below may help you find more information about the Wooden Boat Plans Australia. Thank you for visiting, have a great day.

Read More..

Boat Plans Arch Davis | Avoiding changes of use from B1 a to C3

Boat Plans Arch Davis

NOTE: For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of the changes of use that are now authorised by the GPDO, and the way in which these are (or should be) handled by Local Planning Authorities, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book on the subject - ”A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

It has been reported that Brighton & Hove wish to prevent changes of use from Class B1(a) to C3 within their area by means of an Article 4 Direction. They were one of the authorities that applied unsuccessfully to be exempted from the provisions of the amended GPDO before these changes were made.

A news report states that the council “are to consider applying for an Article 4 direction from the Department for Communities and Local Government so that some areas of the city are exempt from the policy.” Strictly speaking, an LPA does not in fact need to apply to De-CLoG for an Article 4 Direction; they have the power to make the Direction themselves. Even if there are objections to the Direction, there is no longer a requirement for the Direction to be confirmed by the Secretary of State, although the LPA must properly consider any objections before confirming the Direction.

What the writer of the news story may have had in mind is that under the Town & Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (Amendment) (England) Order 2010 (SI 2010 No.654) LPAs are obliged to give notice of Article 4 directions to De-CLoG, and cannot confirm them for 28 days or such longer period as the Secretary of State may specify following notice of the draft Article 4 direction having been received by De-CLoG from the LPA.

The Secretary of State has power under Art. 5(13) to make a direction cancelling or modifying an Article 4 Direction at any time before or after its confirmation by the LPA, although Art 6(3) prevents the S of S from using this power in respect of certain classes of PD in a conservation area. Art 6(4) also prevents the S of S from modifying (but not from cancelling) an Article 4 direction which relates to a listed building (if it does not relate to land of any other description).

It may be the requirement to give notice of the Article 4 Direction to De-CLoG, coupled with the power that Uncle Eric has to make a direction cancelling or modifying an Article 4 Direction, that has led Brighton & Hove to decide that they need to go cap-in-hand to De-CLoG to beg them not to cancel an Article 4 Direction if they make one.

So, as I pointed out in a post some months ago (long before the amendments to the GPDO were finally made), Uncle Eric does have the whip hand in such matters, and can promptly overrule any Article 4 directions which seek to remove the extended PD rights he has so recently created. When these changes were first mooted last year I predicted a sort of ministerial ping-pong match, with Uncle Eric lobbing the ball back over the net every time an LPA makes an Article 4 direction in an attempt to remove the extended PD rights. But do De-CLoG ministers really want a series of stand-up fights with LPAs over this? I suspect that saner counsels may in fact prevail, and there may be some sort of negotiated settlement which would allow Brighton & Hove and other LPAs to make Article 4 Directions that exclude the permitted development right to change from a use within Class B1(a) to C3 in some parts of their area, or which modify this PD right in some other way that would exclude certain types of building or particular types of conversion.

Brighton & Hove are due to take a decision on 11 July on how to take this proposal forward, and it will be interesting to see how this develops. Other LPAs will no doubt be following this matter with considerable interest.

© MARTIN H GOODALL
___________________

UPDATE (12 July) : Brighton and Hove are going ahead with their Article 4 Direction, and it seems that a number of other councils are now proposing to make these directions. It will be interesting to see whether Uncle Eric or the boy Boles use their ministerial powers to block these directions. Meanwhile Islington LBC is contemplating a legal challenge to the GPDO amendment order by way of judicial review, based on the way the consultation process was carried out prior to the governments decision as to whether particular authorities should be exempted from the order. Other councils could join in if these proceedings get off the ground.



Do you find information about Boat Plans Arch Davis are you looking for? If not, below may help you find more information about the Boat Plans Arch Davis. Thank you for visiting, have a great day.

Read More..

Boat Plans Pdf | The 56 day rule a practical example

Boat Plans Pdf

NOTE: For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of this subject, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book - “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

When I wrote my piece on the 56-day rule the other day, I queried the position where notification of the council’s determination of the prior approval application went out very close to the deadline, and so was not received by the applicant within the 56-day period. I am grateful to a correspondent for drawing my attention in this connection to an appeal decision in Tower Hamlets, issued on 24 June 2013 (APP/E5900/C/12/2182746).

This was an application for prior approval in respect of a telephone kiosk under Part 24. The inspector stated at the beginning of his decision letter that the authority had 56 days in which to give notice whether prior approval was required, and for the applicant to receive such notice. It appears to have been assumed without question in this case that a written notification sent within the 56 days but not received by the applicant within that time would not comply with the 56-day rule, so that the right to carry out the development then became automatic, notwithstanding the LPA’s decision and the purported notice of their refusal of the prior approval application.

Both parties agreed that the time within which the applicant should have received such notice expired on 26 December 2011. The authority sent out an undated letter on 23 December refusing prior approval. That letter was received by the appellant in the post on 29 December 2011, outside the 56-day period. However, a copy of this letter was also sent out by two emails at 4.32 p.m. on 23 December, one of which went to the email address given on the applicant’s headed notepaper, and was received by them on that day.

There can be no doubt that transmission of the letter by email to the applicant’s stated email address was an effective communication of the written notice of the LPA’s determination of the prior approval application, notwithstanding that the applicant had not confirmed on the application that they would agree to receive communications by email. Section 329(1)(cc) of the 1990 Act permits the service of a notice using electronic communications where an address for service has been given (as it had been by virtue of its being shown on the applicant’s headed notepaper).

The question, however, still arose as to whether the receipt of the email at or shortly after 4.32 p.m. on 23 December was actually in time. At first sight it seems obvious that it must have been. But there’s a catch!

The applicant relied on Section 336(4A) of the 1990 Act, which provides that where an electronic communication is used for the purpose of serving or giving a notice or other document on or to any person for the purposes of this Act, and the communication is received by that person outside that person’s business hours, it is to be taken to have been received on the next working day, and in this subsection, “working day” means a day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, Bank Holiday or other public holiday.

The inspector quite rightly drew attention to the words “that person’s business hours”. This does not mean ‘normal’ business hours, but the business hours which that person chooses to keep. Whilst it may be usual for offices to remain open until 5.00 or 5.30 p.m., some businesses do close down earlier on Friday afternoons and this was, of course, the last working day before the Christmas holiday, so it is not surprising that the applicant’s office closed down for Christmas before 4.30 on that day. In any event, if a person keeps business hours that are different from the norm, it is their own business hours which apply for this purpose.

In this case, therefore, the email of 23 December had been received outside the applicant’s working hours, and so (in accordance with section 336(4A)) it had to be taken to have been received on the next working day, which was Wednesday 28 December in this case, because Christmas Day fell on a Sunday and so there was an extra Bank Holiday on Tuesday 27 December. So the notification of the council’s refusal of prior approval was received outside the 56-day period after all, and on that basis the Inspector held the applicant had been entitled (as they did) to go ahead with the erection of the telephone kiosk.

I am not aware of this appeal decision having been challenged, but I note that whilst paragraph A.2(6)(a) of Part 24 refers to “the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice of their prior determination that such prior approval is not required”, sub-paragraph (b) uses the words “the giving of that approval to the applicant, in writing”, and sub-paragraph (c) uses the words “notifying the applicant, in writing, that such approval is given or refused”. Sub-paragraph (d) also uses the words “notifying the applicant, in writing, of their determination as to whether such approval is required”. So the only sub-paragraph that refers to the receipt of written notice by the applicant is (a), relating to a notification (at any time, but in practice within the 56-day period, because one of the other sub-paragraphs would otherwise apply) that prior approval is not required.

I am not totally confident that the inspector’s easy assumption that notification of the refusal of prior approval of the Part 24 application had to be received by the applicant within the 56-day period is necessarily correct. It seems that, so far as notice under sub-paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) is concerned, simply dispatching the notice to the applicant within the 56-day period might in fact meet the time limit, even if that written notification is not received within the 56-day period. If that is correct, then section 336(4A) will not have any application, because it is only relevant in those cases where it is the date of receipt of the notice that counts.

In paragraph N of Part 3, sub-paragraph (a) refers to “the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice of their determination that such prior approval is not required” and sub-paragraph (b) refers to “the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice giving their prior approval”. So far so good; but sub-paragraph (c) refers to “the expiry of 56 days following the date on which the application was received by the local planning authority without the authority notifying the applicant as to whether prior approval is given or refused”.

Which brings us back to the point where we started, with the query I first raised in my post on 9 February. I argued in that piece that sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph N should be interpreted, in the light of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), as referring to the receipt of that notification by the applicant. But I am still not confident that the courts would agree with this interpretation if the point were ever to be argued before them. Telecoms companies seem to have taken an aggressive stance on this in relation to Part 24 and, in the absence of an adjudication by the High Court, they seem to have persuaded LPAs, and at least one inspector on appeal, that notification of the council’s determination of the prior approval application must be received within the 56-day period. Maybe we should proceed on this working assumption and hope that no LPA ever feels brave enough to litigate the point!

© MARTIN H GOODALL


Do you find information about Boat Plans Pdf are you looking for? If not, below may help you find more information about the Boat Plans Pdf. Thank you for visiting, have a great day.

Read More..

Boat Plans Aluminum | Catching up

Boat Plans Aluminum

Continuing work on “The Book” (actually a writing project involving several different titles), combined with a recent holiday, has resulted in a more than usually lengthy delay since my last post here.

There is quite a backlog of topics on which I could write, but still being very short of time, I will just make a few passing comments on some topical issues.

The government, and their various opponents, are now in full election mode, with only three weeks left before parliament is dissolved, when the so-called ‘short’ campaign (a full five weeks of it) commences. There is clearly going to be quite a bit of unfinished business left over, the ultimate fate of which is going to depend on the outcome of the election.

Rather surprisingly, Eric Pickles’ current PPS threw doubt the other day on the government’s intention to go ahead with their previously enthusiastic proposal to make permanent those permitted development rights that are currently due to expire on 30 May 2016. These comprise the authorisation of larger domestic extensions and the residential conversion of offices that fall within Use Class B1(a). So even if we get a Conservative, or Conservative-led, government after 7 May, it seems there is now some doubt as to whether these temporary permitted development rights will be extended to 30 May 2019, as the government had proposed, and then perhaps be made permanent.

Despite ministerial harrumphing (and Uncle Eric is very good at doing that, if nothing else), relaxation of the restriction on short-term lets in Greater London still remains in doubt. The Bill on which this depends (which is expected to become the Deregulation Act 2015), having proceeded at a snail’s pace through the House of Lords, had its Third Reading there on 4 March and now awaits what our parliamentarians delight in calling “Ping-pong” (consideration of Lords’ amendments by the Commons, return of any rejected amendments to the Lords for further consideration, and so on – hence the name), which is due on 10 March.

Royal Assent should follow quite quickly after that, possibly even the very next day (11 March) but the new Act will not actually amend the 1973 Act, which prohibits short-term lets in Greater London; it will simply give the Secretary of State power to make a statutory instrument amending or modifying that prohibition. Up to yesterday, I had been under the impression that there is no longer enough time left in which to lay such subordinate legislation before parliament in this session, but I see that the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contraventions (England) General (Amendment) Regulations 2015 were made yesterday, laid before Parliament today (just 25 days before parliament is dissolved), and will come into force on 6 April, i.e. in one calendar month from now.

If the Deregulation Act receives Royal Assent next week, on the day after a very quick consideration of Lords amendments, we already know that the relevant section will come in to force immediately on the passing of the Act; so could Uncle Eric make the requisite Order on 12 March, lay it before parliament on 13 March and bring it into force on 13 April? That would allow no more than 18 days for theoretical consideration of this statutory instrument before the dissolution of parliament. I don’t have access to a copy of Erskine May, so I don’t know whether this is procedurally permissible or not. Perhaps the Opposition could put a spanner in the works by proposing a negative resolution in that event.

However, if I was right in my previous assumption that by the time the Deregulation Bill receives Royal Assent it will then be too late to lay fresh subordinate legislation before parliament, or if it can be de-railed by the tabling of a negative resolution, then it will be entirely dependent on the view on this issue that is adopted by the ministers who are in office after 7 May as to whether this ever comes forward. Ministers have not in any event said that they will wholly revoke the restriction on short-term lets in Greater London, and so any amending order that may be made could be quite limited in its effect, and be hedged around with various ifs and buts.

© MARTIN H GOODALL


Do you find information about Boat Plans Aluminum are you looking for? If not, below may help you find more information about the Boat Plans Aluminum. Thank you for visiting, have a great day.

Read More..

Yacht Boat Plans | The 56 day rule – another example

Yacht Boat Plans

NOTE: For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of this subject, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book - “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

I am grateful to a correspondent for passing on to me details of another appeal decision, issued last month, which dealt with the practical operation of the 56-day rule. This appeal related to a prior approval application under Part 3, Class MB, involving the residential conversion of a detached barn to produce two dwellings. The appellant claimed that he did not receive notification of the council’s decision within the 56-day period. It was agreed by both parties that the 56-day period would have expired on 4 June 2014. The council’s decision was dated 3 June, but the decision was not authorised under the council’s scheme of delegation until 4 June. Thus the decision could not have been sent out until Day 56 at the earliest.

The applicant stated that he had received the decision by post on 9 June, and that the council’s website was also updated with details of the decision on that day. He stated that the decision was not emailed to him. The council did not comment on or contradict any of this evidence. The inspector therefore held that, if the decision was posted on 4 June it would have been received by the appellant after the 56-day period and therefore that the postal notification did not take place within the statutory period.

As in the Tower Hamlets appeal (under Part 24), which I summarised in a previous post, the inspector in this case appears to have assumed that notification of the council’s decision must not only be dispatched (whether by hand, by post or electronically) within the 56-day period, but that it must actually be received by the applicant within that period.

Maybe in light of both of the Tower Hamlets decision and now this decision we can assume that this is the rule (until or unless the High Court tells us otherwise!). On the other hand, I understand that there have been other appeal decisions on the 56-day rule (which I have not seen) that went the other way, so maybe the jury is still out on this issue.

One other point that can be quickly disposed of is the implied suggestion (which has also been raised elsewhere) that publication of the council’s decision on its website could be taken as ‘notifying the applicant’ of the council’s decision. In my view, this could not amount to notification for the purposes of paragraph N(9)(c). Notification requires a written communication addressed to the applicant (or their agent), whether by post or by email, and merely posting information on the council’s website would not suffice for this purpose.

UPDATE: I now have the appeal reference for the decision reported above, kindly supplied by Mike Rutter. It is 2224715. If you go into the Planning Portal website, search for appeals and type in this reference, a few more key clicks will bring up a PDF of the decision letter.

© MARTIN H GOODALL


Do you find information about Yacht Boat Plans are you looking for? If not, below may help you find more information about the Yacht Boat Plans. Thank you for visiting, have a great day.

Read More..