Wooden Boat Plans And Kits | Agricultural occupancy conditions and ‘dependants’

Wooden Boat Plans And Kits

The wording of the model agricultural occupancy condition (No. 45 in Appendix A to Circular 11/95, which remains extant following the cancellation of the remainder of that circular) has been widely used by many LPAs. It reads:

“The occupation of the dwelling shall be limited to a person solely or mainly working, or last working, in the locality in agriculture or in forestry, or a widow or widower of such a person, and to any resident dependants”.

The question inevitably arises as to whether there would be a breach of such a condition where a member of the family living with the agricultural worker is not financially dependent on that person. The point was considered by the House of Lords in Fawcett Properties Ltd v Bucks CC [1961] AC 636, and the general impression derived from that judgment was that financial dependence was the qualifying criterion.

However, the question arose again in the case of Shortt v. SSCLG [2014] EWHC 2480 (Admin), in which judgment was given on 22 July. An LDC had been sought from the LPA on the basis of a continuous 10-year breach of the AOC, based on the fact that (a) the person actually working in the locality in agriculture had made a consistent loss in the agricultural enterprise throughout that period and (b) that, in consequence of this, the person’s husband was not financially dependent on her, and so could not be a ‘dependant’ for the purposes of the condition. The LPA failed to determine the LDC application, so the applicant appealed to the Planning Inspectorate under section 195.

The Inspector took what many would consider to have been a very sound commonsense approach to this issue. In his view, the appellant’s contention in reliance on Fawcett was an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the wording of the condition. In the context of people living in a family, the words subsistence and support are capable of having a non-monetary construction, he suggested. Furthermore, were the meaning of ‘dependant’ in the condition to be invariably interpreted as financially dependent, it would leave members of a family who lived in a dwelling whose occupation was the subject of such a condition, but who were not themselves working in agriculture, at risk of enforcement action whenever the agricultural worker’s income fell below a level deemed to establish dependency, which would be a nonsense. The Inspector considered that the wording of the condition should be interpreted so as to avoid such a possibility, having regard to the potential impact on, or interference with, ordinary family life.

For the purposes of the High Court application, the judge assumed that Mrs Shortt was an agricultural worker, but made no profit from the farm in any year, and therefore made no financial contribution to the family. This was clear from the evidence of her accounts. After considering various statutory definitions of ‘dependant’ in other legislation, His Lordship observed that, so far as the definition of “dependant” is concerned, context is everything.

Turning to the decision of the House of Lords in Fawcett, in His Lordship’s view that decision was is itself equivocal as to whether “dependant” in the statutory context from which agricultural occupancy conditions derive necessarily requires an element of financial dependency. Various appeal decision had been called in aid by the applicant, but these were not entirely in her favour. For example, in one case (Land at Meadows, Colwell Road, Freshwater, Isle of Wight: Planning Inspectorate Appeal No App/C/96/P2114/643380), the Inspector did not consider that “the condition could be construed as excluding a married couple, one of whom works outside agriculture”, where the agricultural worker appears to have earned nothing from that enterprise. Therefore, His Lordship held, even in the statutory context (or a context in which the precise statutory wording had been adopted), there is no clear authority to the effect that “dependant” necessarily implies financial dependency.

The wording of the condition in the present case differed slightly from the model condition, and this appears to have had a material effect on the judge’s decision. The condition did not simply refer to agricultural workers and their dependants, but agricultural workers and “the dependants (which shall be taken to include a widow or widower) of such persons”. So “dependants” here were deemed to include a widow or widower of an agricultural worker, whether or not, before that worker’s death, the spouse was financially dependent upon him or her. It would strain the construction of the condition too far for it to mean “the dependants (which shall be taken to include a widow or widower who was, prior to the agricultural worker’s death, a financial dependant of that worker)”.

Given that “dependants” may or may not include dependency other than financial dependency depending upon the context of the word, it seemed to His Lordship that, if the term is to include a widow or widower irrespective of earlier financial dependency, looked at objectively, it must have been intended to have included a husband or wife without financial dependency. In his view it could not have been the intention of the condition to prohibit spouses who are not financially dependent upon an agricultural worker from occupying the dwelling during the worker’s life, but allow such spouses to occupy it after the worker’s death.

Therefore, the words as used in the condition, looked at as a whole, appeared to His Lordship to envisage “dependency” in a wider and more open-textured way than one requiring an element of financial dependency, certainly to include a spouse and minor children of the worker who is their wife and mother and who provides them with usual family services and care.

To that extent it could perhaps be argued that this judgment is dependent on its facts, that is to say, on the precise wording of this condition. The judge himself pointed out that he was restricting himself to construing the particular condition in this case. It was unnecessary for him to seek to construe “dependants” in the statutory context, and he declined to do so. No doubt he was unwilling to be seen to be differing from a House of Lords decision, but Fawcett was decided over 50 years ago in a very different social and economic context, and a broader interpretation of “dependants” may now be more appropriate, not least because a narrow interpretation could throw up some undesirable and even nonsensical anomalies in such cases, as the Inspector pointed out.

It remains to be seen how much weight can be placed on Shortt as an authority on this issue, but I suggest that Fawcett, even though it was a House of Lords decision, should no longer be uncritically accepted as authority for the proposition that, in the context of an AOC, the interpretation of “dependant” is necessarily confined to financial dependants. It should reasonably be taken to include those in a family relationship with the agricultural worker living with them, such as spouses and even perhaps adult children, even though those persons are financially independent.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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Boat Building Plans And Kits | Short term lets in Greater London the proposed relaxation

Boat Building Plans And Kits

Since I last blogged on this topic on Friday 13 June (“Announcing it twice. Announcing it twice.”), the promised new clause has been added to the Deregulation Bill. It was originally New Clause 21, but numbers are liable to change as further amendments are added to the Bill and, when I looked the other day, it had become Clause 34. I am making no guesses as to what the section number in the new Act will eventually be!

The clause is headed “Short-term use of London accommodation: power to relax restrictions”. It is purely an enabling power, so we still don’t know precisely how, to what extent, and indeed when, the government will relax the current rule on short-term lets in Greater London.

The new clause will give the Secretary of State power to make regulations by statutory instrument which will provide for the circumstances in which the use as temporary sleeping accommodation of any residential premises in Greater London does not involve a material change of use by virtue of section 25(1) of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1973.

The regulations may also enable the Secretary of State or an LPA to direct that any provision included in those regulations will not apply to particular residential premises or to residential premises situated in a particular area. So there will be an opt-out which some of the London Boroughs will be eager to use (always assuming that power is not reserved to the Secretary of State to override the LPA’s direction, as he can in the case of Article 4 Directions).

The regulations may also in themselves amend the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1973, and there is a catch-all power that allows them to make different provisions for different purposes and/or include incidental, supplementary, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions. This really does give the Secretary of State carte blanche.

So we are really none the wiser for having seen the new clause. Government press releases are not a reliable guide to what is really intended, or whether those intentions will in practice be achieved by the proposed regulations. Given the dire performance of civil servants in drafting subordinate legislation over the years, I am not confident that they will actually do what it says on the tin. Only time will tell.

I have already pointed out the dangers of substantially removing the existing restrictions in section 25(1) of the 1973 Act ( - see “Short-term lets in Greater London” posted on Tuesday, 25 February 2014), and I know that these concerns are shared by other commentators, such as Michael Bach, as set out in his article on this topic in the Summer 2014 issue of “newsforum”, the journal of the London Forum of Amenity and Civic Societies. Planning officers and others concerned with planning and housing throughout the Greater London area will be equally worried by the implications of the proposed changes.

For the time being, we have no choice but to wait and see what eventually emerges. There is at least one advantage of the method by which the government has chosen to deal with issue; a future government could use the enabling powers to restore the restriction on short-term lets in the capital without having to pass any amending primary legislation. Nice one, Sir Humphrey!

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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Boat Trailer Plans Australia | “Events dear boy Events ”

Boat Trailer Plans Australia

Harold Macmillan never used those precise words, but the best quotations are often misquotes. Anyway, it is events that have conspired to prevent my posting on this blog since 18 June, and as the BBC used to say in the days of steam-driven television - ‘We apologise for this break in transmission. Normal service will be resumed as soon as possible.”

MARTIN H GOODALL

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Boat Plans Canada | Agricultural dwellings the operational need test

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On Monday 2 April 2012 , I published a post entitled “Agricultural development after the NPPF” in which I suggested that there need not be any change in practice relating to the provision of agricultural workers’ dwellings, and the methodology for assessing the functional need for such a dwelling, nor need there be any change of approach in relation into the imposition and removal of agricultural occupancy conditions.

I felt that without referring to the detailed guidance set out in Annex A of PPS7, it would be difficult in practice to give effect to the policy set out in paragraph 55 of the NPPF, which simply provides that isolated homes in the countryside should be avoided unless there are special circumstances such as (among other things) the essential need for a rural worker to live permanently at or near their place of work in the countryside. Unlike PPS7, the NPPF offers no guidance as to how “the essential need for a rural worker to live permanently at or near their place of work” is to be assessed in practice, whereas Annex A of PPS7 was notably prescriptive in setting out the criteria that would have to be met in order to prove that need.

I concluded that De-CLoG could avoid any doubt and confusion which the withdrawal of PPS7 may have caused by re-publishing Annex A of PPS7 in the form of a Circular. Failure to do so, I surmised, could lead to legal disputes which might otherwise be avoided.

I am grateful to a correspondent for drawing my attention to just such a dispute. This was an application for judicial review of a planning permission in the High Court in R (Embleton PC) v. Northumberland CC [2013] EWHC 3631 (Admin). It was what can only be described as a ‘root and branch’ attack on the grant of planning permission in this case, which included a temporary permission for an agricultural dwelling. I propose, however, to confine myself to the challenge regarding the operational justification for an agricultural dwelling. This, as well as every one of the other grounds of challenge, was rejected by the court.

It was common ground between the parties that government guidance was a material planning consideration to be taken into account by the Committee in reaching a decision. The relevant guidance was contained in PPS7 prior to 27th March 2012 and paragraph 55 of NPPF thereafter. Under Annex A, paragraph 12(iii) of PPS7 the applicant had to provide clear evidence that the proposed enterprise has been planned on a sound financial basis, whereas Paragraph 55 of NPPF is merely expressed in the terms I have quoted above. Thus, the judge observed, the guidance in paragraph 55 of NPPF is significantly less onerous than it was in PPS7.

The judge accepted that the test under paragraph 55 of NPPF is different from the test under Annex A, paragraph 12(iii) of PPS7. In particular he did not accept the claimant’s submission that the NPPF requires that the proposal is economically viable. As the LPA pointed out, this was a temporary permission lasting for only 3 years. The NPPF test simply requires a judgment of whether the proposed agricultural enterprise has an essential need for a worker to be there or near there [although, in my own view, this seems to beg the question as to how that essential need is to be objectively assessed]. In the event, the judge agreed that the evidence was that there was a need for a rural worker to take care of the livestock once calf rearing commenced. In his view the Committee were entitled to accept that evidence. It was not an irrational decision.

His lordship equally agreed that the decision was not invalidated by the failure to provide the agricultural expert’s figures to the Committee. The figures were not available at the date of the meeting. It was not in dispute that the Committee were provided with an expert report and that a principal objector had the opportunity to address the meeting. In the course of his submissions the objector criticised the expert’s report, so the issue was before the Committee. The Committee were nevertheless entitled to reject that submission and plainly did so.

The learned judge held that, whilst it was no doubt open to the Committee to reject the planning application it could not in his view be said to be irrational to have granted it. It was open to them to hold that there was an essential need for a rural worker to live permanently at or near the livestock building. It was a matter for their judgment whether such a need could be satisfied by a short term let. A short term let is terminable after 6 months, which is far shorter than the 3 years for which the temporary permission was granted. In those circumstances the decision to grant the permission could not in his view be said to be irrational or unreasonable.

This judgment would tend to suggest that my supposition that an objective test substantially similar to the detailed test required by Annex A to PPS7 would still have to be applied in order to give effect to paragraph 55 of the NPPF may not be supported by the courts, in light of the much less prescriptive language used in that paragraph of the NPPF. I cannot believe that this is what ministers intended, but it would appear that their insistence on cutting the statement of ministerial planning policy to the bare bone may have come back to bite them.

[UPDATE: In light of the Court of Appeal decision in Redhill Aerodrome v. SSCLG (see now Interpreting the National Planning Policy Framework (6 November 2014), there must be some doubt as to the correctness of the approach taken by the High Court in Embleton PC.]

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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Boat Plans Nz | Green Belt policy – the need for reform

Boat Plans Nz

Last week I came across a useful contribution to the Green Belt debate by Peter Village QC and Jonathan Darby, which you can access at http://www.39essex.com/docs/general/pv_and_jda_green_belt_article_final_.pdf

They call (as I and other commentators have done recently) for a sensible rethink of Green Belt policy, rather than the die-hard defence of existing Green Belt boundaries that ministers have lately adopted (undoubtedly for what they perceive as their short-term electoral advantage in the run-up to the General Election), irrespective of its proper role and value in policy terms, and irrespective of the consequences of such an unyielding approach in terms of unbuilt homes to meet the urgent needs of our population.

There are two important points that must be understood about the Green Belt. First, our Green Belts have been massively expanded within the past 30 to 40 years. The Green Belt was never intended to cover such vast swathes of land as it does now, and it really does need to be objectively reviewed and rolled back in some areas. Secondly, until the late 1980s, there was some flexibility in the application of Green Belt policy.

This was well illustrated by the judgment in Cranford Hall Parking Ltd v. SSE [1989] J.P.L. 169. Relevant policy at that time was set out in Circular 14/85, which was couched in language not dissimilar to later policy statements in PPG2, yet not in such absolute terms. The Circular pointed out quite clearly that the fact that a site was Green Belt land did not in itself constitute a clear-cut and sound reason for refusing permission. The court, in quashing an appeal decision which had refused planning permission for development in the Green Belt, held that the Inspector should have considered whether or not this development would bring about demonstrable harm to the Green Belt. Thus (at that time) development was not automatically unacceptable in the Green Belt; it was a question for the judgment of the decision-maker.

A similar decision was reached in Barnet Meeting Room Trust v SSE (1990) 60 P. & C.R. 137. In that case an Inspector had recommended that the Secretary of State should allow an appeal against the refusal of development in the Green Belt in these terms:

“I conclude that the development would not significantly detract from the character and appearance of the area, nor significantly threaten the integrity of the Metropolitan Green Belt, and that positive benefits would flow from the proposed landscape treatment of a former derelict site.”

The Inspector did recognise that, in a strict sense, the proposal would be unlikely to “preserve or improve the open nature of the area” in terms of the requirements set by para. 9.16 of the Greater London Development Plan. Nonetheless he recommended that on balance, and bearing in mind the established need for the development, the appeal should be allowed.

By this time, PPG2 in its original form had been published, and the Secretary of State’s decision letter, rejecting the Inspector’s recommendation, ended with the words: “The Secretary of State is of the opinion that, on balance, there are not the special circumstances to justify development in a Green Belt. Accordingly he disagrees with the recommendation.”

The Deputy Judge (Sir Frank Layfield QC) found that the Secretary of State had paid no great attention here to the need for consistency of decisions in comparable instances or to the need, when related decisions are cited to him, to provide reasons why those decisions should be regarded as either of no or limited value to the case under consideration. The learned Deputy Judge held that, very importantly in the Green Belt, the general presumption in favour of development applied (at that time) in favour of allowing applications for development as it did in other areas (relying on Cranford Hall Parking).

In that previous case there was a presumption derived from earlier circulars that were still current at that time that inappropriate development would not be permitted within the Green Belt and there were, no doubt, cases where the fact that the proposals were inappropriate and damaging to the interests of Green Belt policy would be self-evident. But the circular pointed out, quite clearly, that the fact it was in Green Belt land did not in itself constitute a clear cut and sound reason for refusing permission. The right approach was a presumption that planning permission would always be allowed which would be overridden where it was shown that the development would cause demonstrable harm to the Green Belt policy. In this regard, no reason or explanation had been given as to why the provisions of Circular 14/85 (which included the general presumption in favour of development) were not considered. Since development in the green belt was a question of fundamental importance, it was for that reason alone that this decision was quashed in the absence of adequate reasoning in that regard.

Those two cases were, of course, decided within a rather different policy context compared with that which obtains at present, and they have no practical application within the current policy regime; but they both serve to show that an alternative policy approach is perfectly workable, and would not involve a ‘free-for-all’ approach to development in the Green Belt. If the principles illustrated by those two cases were to be re-applied now (by means of revised ministerial policy on this issue), there would in future be an objective examination, as there used to be until the late 1980s, of the site’s ‘Green Belt value’, and consideration as to whether its development would cause demonstrable harm to the openness of the Green Belt (which is the primary objective of its designation as such). As I can clearly recall from the early days of my career as a planning lawyer, going back as far as 1979, appeals could be and in practice were allowed in appropriate cases where the site made no material contribution to the Green Belt and/or where its development would not cause any demonstrable harm to the openness of the Green Belt. The present rigid resistance to any development in the Green Belt, save only in the most exceptional circumstances, is unnecessary and undesirable.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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Boat Plans Bateau | Residential conversion of agricultural buildings ecological considerations

Boat Plans Bateau

Neil Pearce at Wychavon DC has raised with me a point arising from the conversion of agricultural buildings to residential use under Class MB in Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO. This relates to the appropriateness of a requirement that certain ecological surveys should be carried out. There are actually two points –

(1) Can the need to protect bats or other protected species be a material consideration in the determination of a prior approval application under Class MB?

(2) Can pre-commencement conditions relating to ecological surveys and protection measures be attached to a notice of prior approval under Class MB?

Paragraph MB.2 provides that the change of use under Class MB(a) is permitted subject to the condition that before beginning the development, the developer shall apply to the local planning authority for a determination as to whether the prior approval of the authority will be required as to—

(a) transport and highways impacts of the development,
(b) noise impacts of the development,
(c) contamination risks on the site,
(d) flooding risks on the site, or
(e) whether the location or siting of the building makes it otherwise impractical or undesirable for the building to change from agricultural use to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses),

and it goes on to say that the provisions of paragraph N of Part 3 shall apply in relation to any such application.

As I pointed out in earlier blog posts relating to the changes to the GPDO made in 2013 and 2014, paragraph N provides that the local planning authority must, when determining a prior approval application have regard to the National Planning Policy Framework as if the application were a planning application.

The consensus of opinion seems to be that, notwithstanding paragraph N, the LPA is in fact constrained in its consideration of the prior approval application to the criteria listed in the relevant class in Part 3 (in this case, paragraph MB2). I believe that several appeal decisions have now been issued that confirm this approach.

In the case of Class MB, however, the criteria that the LPA must take into account are rather more wide-ranging than they are under certain other classes. In particular, these criteria include consideration as to whether the location or siting of the building makes it impractical for any other reason (besides the others that are listed) or undesirable for the building to change from agricultural use to residential use. This seems to me potentially to introduce all sorts of other factors that might arguably militate against the residential conversion of the building. Among these, I suggest, could be ecological considerations, including the presence of protected species, such as bats.

I am told that Wychavon has a lot of bats (Stop sniggering at the back there!) and some enthusiastic ecologists. The argument is that, whilst not expressly referred to as one of the prior approval issues for an LPA to consider, ecology (and in particular the conservation of protected species) remains a key factor in the conversion of rural buildings. The ecologists very reasonably point out that the De-CLoG response to consultation on this issue stated that “All changes under permitted development are required to meet necessary habitats and environmental legislation and regulations.”. Furthermore, Section 40 of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 requires all public bodies to have regard to biodiversity conservation when carrying out their functions. In the exercise of its functions, an LPA is also required to have regard to the requirements of The Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010. I am bound to say that this does seem to me to be an entirely reasonable approach, and I really can’t fault the ecologists’ view on this issue.

The ecologists also point out, again quite rightly, that Paragraph N of Part 3 provides that “the local planning authority may require the developer to submit such information as the authority may reasonably require in order to determine the application, which may include —

(a)assessments of impacts or risks;
(b)statements setting out how impacts or risks are to be mitigated; or
(c)details of proposed operational development;”.

The ecologists believe that the implications for protected species should be considered as “impacts or risks”. Again, I really can’t disagree with that. They also take the point which I referred to earlier that prior approval applications are required to be determined with regard to the requirements of the NPPF. This requires decisions to be taken with regard to protected species. The ecologists therefore feel that the council should require a prior approval application to be accompanied by an appropriate assessment of the potential impact upon protected species and a mitigation strategy, if there are protected species at risk of harm from the development.

This would certainly be done if the LPA was dealing with an application for planning permission, and I am inclined to the view that a similar approach would be appropriate in the case of prior approval applications under Class MB. One might argue that this makes a nonsense of the principle of “permitted development”, but I think this is inherent in the whole prior approval concept that the government has devised. I have previously described it as “planning permission-lite”. It would be a serious mistake for anyone to run away with the idea that the government ever intended a free-for-all for residential developments in the countryside . Some people may find this disappointing, but that’s the way it is.

I mentioned earlier the issue of pre-commencement conditions. The 2014 amendment to Part 3 made it clear that LPAs have the right to impose conditions on prior approvals in the same way, and subject to the same rules and considerations, as in the case of planning permissions. It follows that pre-commencement conditions may be appropriate in some cases, and such conditions might include protection measures for fauna and flora, among other things.

I don’t think Neil was expecting me to come down on the side of the ecologists, but as a lawyer I just have to interpret the law as it stands, irrespective of my personal views as to whether it is ‘right’ or not in a political sense.

NOTE: This is one of the many topics that are discussed in the author’s new book - “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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